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ABSTRACT 
 
Using data on the entire population of businesses registered in the states of California and 
Massachusetts between 1995 and 2011, we decompose the well-established gender gap in 
entrepreneurship. We show that female-led ventures are 63 percentage points less likely 
than male-led ventures to obtain external funding (i.e., venture capital). The most 
significant portion of the gap (65 percent) stems from gender differences in initial startup 
orientation, with women being less likely to found ventures that signal growth potential 
to external investors. However, the residual gap is as much as 35 percent and much of 
this disparity likely reflects investors’ gendered preferences. Consistent with theories of 
statistical discrimination, the residual gap diminishes significantly when stronger signals 
of growth are available to investors for comparable female- and male-led ventures or 
when focal investors appear to be more sophisticated. Finally, conditional on the 
reception of external funds (i.e., venture capital), women and men are equally likely to 
achieve exit outcomes, through IPOs or acquisitions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurship is one of the most important features of today’s economy (Kacperczyk, 2012; 
Kacperczyk and Younkin, 2018; Carnahan, Agarwal, and Campbell, 2012). But launching a new 
venture appears to be particularly disadvantageous for women, who are significantly less likely 
to succeed as entrepreneurs (Canning, Haque, and Wang, 2012). The imbalance between female 
and male entrepreneurs is especially stark among high-growth ventures, with women 
representing a much smaller share of founders able to achieve high-growth equity outcomes, 
including high-value acquisitions or IPOs (e.g., Robb, Coleman, and Stangler, 2014; 
Balachandra, et al., 2017). In short, there is a wide consensus that women remain largely 
underrepresented in high-growth entrepreneurship.  
Despite this ample research, however, our understanding of gender-based gap in high- 
growth entrepreneurship remains incomplete. A vast majority of studies have focused on gender 
disparities in early investment (e.g., Canning et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2003; Gatewood et al., 
2003; Brush et al., 2014; Coleman and Robb, 2009; Thébaud and Sharkey, 2014), suggesting that 
women are much less likely than men to obtain external capital from investors (Canning et al., 
2012; Greene et al., 2003; Gatewood et al., 2003; Brush et al., 2014). However, we currently 
know less about how various forces might generate disparities between female and male 
entrepreneurs at other points in the process. Entrepreneurship involves a number of stages, from 
founding a new venture, to seeking capital, to exit (e.g., Aldrich and Ruef, 2003). But few 
studies have assessed the relative importance of each stage for generating less-favorable 
outcomes for female entrepreneurs. For example, whether women face greater disadvantage at 
founding or whether such disparities tend to widen later in the process remains open to question. 
From a policy perspective, however, such understanding is critical for addressing gender 
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inequality in entrepreneurship and increasing female representation among high-growth 
entrepreneurs. If differences between female and male entrepreneurs arise at different stages and 
accumulate over time, policies should involve numerous interventions, which target multiple 
actors at multiple stages of entrepreneurship.    
In this study, we extend the current literature by offering a more complete account of 
gender disparities, and document how the gender gap arises at different points in the 
entrepreneurship pipeline. Specifically, we decompose the disparities between female and male 
entrepreneurs into the entrepreneurs’ initial founding choices and the investors’ subsequent 
funding choices. In evaluating their relative contributions to the observed imbalance between 
female and male founders, we propose that gender disparities will tend to reflect different forces 
that place women at a cumulative disadvantage, when they become entrepreneurs.  
First, we build on a growing line of research which highlights the critical role of the 
initial differences in venture’s orientation in driving subsequent performance outcomes (Carter, 
et al., 2003; Chen, Yao and Kotha, 2009; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). To the extent that new 
ventures vary dramatically in their initial growth potential, we expect large disparities between 
female- and male-founded startups to already originate at founding. Consistent with studies on 
gender segregation (e.g., Bielby and Bielby, 1988; Fernandez and Sosa, 2005) and motherhood 
penalty in the workplace (e.g., Budig and England 2001; Jacobs and Gerson, 2004; Correll, 
Benard, and Paik, 2007), gendered processes will systematically structure women’s career 
choices, inclining female entrepreneurs to sort into startups associated with a lower growth 
potential. Because, due to childcaring obligations, women are generally perceived as less 
legitimate or less competent entrepreneurs (Thebaud, 2010; Kacperczyk and Younkin, 2019), 
mobilizing resources to pursue a higher-growth venture will be more difficult. Second, building 
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on the sociological perspectives which emphasize the role of gender in informing evaluations 
under uncertainty (e.g., Ridgeway and Correll, 2006), we propose that significant residual 
disparities will persist even net of differences in venture orientation. Gender disparities will 
continue to arise because investors hold negative biases against female-founded ventures (e.g., 
Brush et al., 2014; Thébaud, 2010; Gompers et al., 2014), given that predominantly male 
investors rely on negative stereotypes about gender when evaluating entrepreneurs’ competences 
(e.g., Thébaud, 2010; Bird and Brush, 2002; Gupta, et al., 2009; Baughn, Chua and Neupert, 
2006; Gupta and Turban, 2012), and male investors will tend to form relations with 
demographically-similar entrepreneurs (e.g., Gompers et al., 2014; Pitchbook, 2017, Ewens and 
Townsend, forthcoming).  
By analyzing the gender gap at different stages in entrepreneurship, we advance our 
understanding of the origins of such disparities in two main ways. First, our approach allows for 
a relative assessment, shedding light on the dual role of a venture’s attributes and investors’ 
assessments in contributing to the imbalance between female and male founders. Prior literature, 
by contrast, has primarily focused on a single stage in the process: the external investment (e.g., 
Canning et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2003; Gatewood et al., 2003; Brush et al., 2014; Coleman and 
Robb, 2009; 2016; Thébaud and Sharkey, 2014).  
Second, we examine the way in which a startup’s attributes influence subsequent access 
to external funding. Researchers have argued that certain startup characteristics affect the odds of 
growth outcomes, such as IPOs or high-value acquisitions, and that this growth orientation is 
responsible for attracting external investment (e.g., Kaplan and Lerner, 2010; Kerr, Nanda, and 
Rhodes-Kropf, 2015; Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). But measuring growth orientation 
empirically is challenging for several reasons. First, data on new ventures are often collected in 
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the later stages of development (such as during the receipt of venture capital), but sample 
selection bias might arise because lower-quality ventures are likely to fail long before they are 
recorded. Moreover, extant accounts have often relied on surveys to measure a venture’s initial 
attributes that influence investment chances (Reynolds, 2000), but these data may suffer from 
important biases, as entrepreneurs reconstruct past events, attitudes, and motivations (Kepler and 
Shane, 2007). Finally, though a number of studies have considered variation in industries in 
which men and women choose to launch new ventures (Carter and Shaw, 2006; Coleman and 
Robb, 2009; Coleman and Robb, 2009; Cliff, 1999; Heilman and Chen, 2003; Morris, et al., 
2006), startup growth orientation can vary even within a single industry (Guzman and Stern, 
2015, 2016, 2017), suggesting the need for more granular measures at the firm level. More 
generally, accounting for initial growth orientation requires developing indicators that leverage 
objective measures based on a population of new firms.  
We leverage data on the population of entrepreneurs in the United States between 1995 
and 2011, in which differences in the initial venturing choices that predict subsequent growth 
outcomes can be readily observed and measured directly. Following Guzman and Stern (2015), 
we use a novel approach that captures these underlying differences for each start-up, using 
publicly available business registration records. We construct a novel dataset containing all 
California and Massachusetts for-profit start-up corporations, limited liability companies, and 
partnerships from 1995 to 2011. We focus on California and Massachusetts as our focal states 
because entrepreneurship and venture capital activity are more prevalent in these regions 
(NVCA, 2015).  
In the resulting comprehensive empirical analysis, we decompose the entrepreneurial 
process into critical points, founding and funding, and identify differences between female and 
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male entrepreneurs at those stages. First, we find that women are much less likely than men to 
start new ventures. In particular, female-led start-ups account for 21 percent of all startups 
registered in California or Massachusetts. Subsequently, female-led startups are much less likely 
to receive external funding, with female founders representing only 10 percent of all venture-
backed startups, and 7 percent of those that achieve an equity growth outcome. However, a 
substantial share of this gap (65 percent) can be explained by the initial differences in startup 
growth orientation, as indicated by observable attributes: the legal form of organization (e.g. 
corporation, LLC, or partnership), the state of jurisdiction in which they choose to organize the 
firm (e.g. Delaware or local), startup name, industry (commerce, biotechnology, or 
semiconductors), founders’ name (i.e., eponymy), 1 and whether a startup has patents and 
trademarks filed close to the time of registration. For example, although women represent 22 
percent of all registered companies, they account for only 12 percent of Delaware registrations (a 
jurisdiction usually associated with growth intentions), 10 percent of companies with patents at 
founding, and 15 percent of all companies in the IT sector. They also account for a higher (25 
percent) share of all companies with names related to local industries (rather than traded 
industries2). When these observables are included in a predictive model to account for a single 
index of growth orientation, female-founded startups represent only 13 percent of the top 5 
percent high-growth startups, and 10 percent of the top 1 percent high-growth startups. Finally, 
we detect a significant residual difference (35 percent) and provide evidence that, at least some 
of this gap, reflects investors’ biases and stereotypes about gender. Further, among comparable 
                                                 
1 Eponymy refers to the use of the founder’s personal first or last name in the name of the company itself (e.g. Ford 
Motor Company). The use of eponymy in entrepreneurship has a recent active line of research (e.g. Belenzon et al, 
2017; Guzman and Stern, 2015).  
2 Traded industries are those whose products are sold outside the local economic area in which they are created.  
Examples include manufactured goods, internet services, and some financial services.  Local industries are 
industries where the product or service is mostly sold locally, such as restaurants. 
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female- and male-founded ventures, this gap in funding diminishes significantly with a stronger 
growth orientation of a new venture (i.e., as it moves towards the top 5 percent, 1 percent, or 0.1 
percent).   
Overall, our findings indicate a dual impact of an initial venture’s orientation and 
investors’ bias in creating gender disparities at different stages of the entrepreneurship process. 
We argue that gendered processes impose constraints on women’s motivation and opportunities 
to found high-growth ventures, creating significant gaps between women and men at different 
points – at founding and investment stages. Our findings further imply that the disadvantage that 
female entrepreneurs face tends to accumulate over time and that interventions aiming at 
multiple stages are therefore warranted for reducing gender inequality in high-growth 
entrepreneurship. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Past Research 
Gender inequality is a persistent feature in entrepreneurship outcomes: women are less 
likely to become entrepreneurs than men (Aldrich, 2005; Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter, 2003) and 
less likely to outperform once a new venture is founded (Kim, Aldrich, and Keister, 2006; Yang 
and Aldrich, 2014). But though the gender-based gap in high-growth entrepreneurship has been 
well documented, the precise origins of such disparities along the entrepreneurial process remain 
less well understood. The majority of previous research has focused on early-stage investment, 
with numerous studies documenting that external investors (i.e., venture capitalists or angels) are 
less likely to provide capital to female entrepreneurs (e.g., Canning et al., 2012; Greene et al., 
2003; Gatewood et al., 2003; Brush et al., 2014). Further evidence suggests that such disparities 
can persist even in experimental conditions, net of any observable differences between female- 
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and male-led ventures (e.g., Thébaud 2010; Bigelow et al. 2014; Brooks et al. 2014; Tinkler et 
al., 2015). Yet despite this fruitful line of inquiry, we currently know less about how each stage 
of the pipeline contributes to the gender gap.  
Rather than being a single event, entrepreneurship is a process, and as such it consists of 
a number of stages, from founding a new venture, to seeking capital, to exit (e.g., Aldrich and 
Ruef, 2003). Although disparities between female and male founders might arise at different 
points in time, reflecting the different obstacles that women face, we currently know little about 
the relative importance of these stages for the overall gender gap in entrepreneurial activity. For 
example, past studies have not assessed the critical points when women tend to lose out the most, 
relative to men. Or, little is known about the nature of the gender gap: Are women equally 
disadvantaged throughout the process, or do gender disparities arise more at some points than 
others?   
In what follows below, we shift the analytical focus to track gender disparities throughout 
the entrepreneurship process and quantify where the gap appears to be the most substantial. In 
probing the origins of disparities between women and men, we propose that differences in 
venture orientation and evaluations of female-founded ventures will drive, in tandem, the 
disparities across female and male entrepreneurs. Specifically, we expect that gendered processes 
will give rise to many initial differences in growth orientation amongst female- and male-led 
ventures, and that women will pursue ventures associated with a lower growth potential. But net 
of these differences, the prevalence of negative stereotypes and gendered expectations held by 
investors will additionally widen gender disparities, putting women at a further disadvantage. 
Finally, to the extent that such residual differences reflect, at least in part, the negative gender 
stereotypes or cultural beliefs about female entrepreneurs, differences between female and male 
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founders will attenuate amongst female-led ventures with stronger signals of growth orientation 
or amongst investors who exhibit greater investment sophistication.  
 
Initial Growth Orientation 
There is a strong reason to expect that gender disparities at the investment stage tend to 
reflect differences that arise earlier in the entrepreneurial process. Recent studies provide 
evidence that there exists a considerable heterogeneity among new ventures already at founding 
and that not all new ventures are created equal. Startups vary significantly in their growth 
potential (Hurst and Pugsley, 2010; Kaplan and Lerner, 2010; Schoar, 2010) and such variation 
can be observed even within a single industry or even among innovative ventures (Guzman and 
Stern, 2015, 2016, 2017). Entrepreneurs make observable founding choices at (or close to) firm 
registration, deciding about the venture’s legal form, naming, and intellectual property, all of 
which signal the growth orientation and the future aspirations of a new company. For example, 
characterizing differences in the growth potential of firms at founding, Guzman and Stern (2015) 
find that growth-oriented entrepreneurs exhibit a number of notable attributes. First, they are 
relatively more likely to register under Delaware jurisdiction rather than their home state (since 
Delaware offers a large canon of law that is useful in the process of growth and enforcement of 
complex contracts), while less growth-oriented entrepreneurs would find Delaware registration 
too costly (around a few thousand dollars per year). Second, growth-oriented entrepreneurs tend 
to set up their firm as a corporation (which can sell shares to investors and IPO) rather than the 
more tax-advantageous LLC, which is common for less growth-oriented startups. Third, growth-
oriented entrepreneurs tend to explore a novel technology or a novel idea, which can warrant the 
costs of applying for a patent or a trademark to protect expected brand and other marketing 
investments. Finally, Guzman and Stern (2015) show that the name of the company itself signals 
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differences in growth orientation, such as growth-oriented startups being less likely to have an 
eponymous name (i.e., be named after the founder), and more likely to have a short name. These 
findings are further consistent with Belenzon, Chatterji, and Daley (2018), who argue that 
eponymous names reflect a trade-off between the need to signal control versus the need to secure 
VC financing, and Green and Jame (2013), who argue on the importance of name appeal in 
influencing perceived firm value. Together, these initial differences at founding affect the odds 
of securing external funds; Guzman and Stern (2016) predict the ex-post performance of 
companies at founding and find that over seventy percent of equity growth outcomes (IPOs or 
acquisitions) occur in the top 5 percent of their predicted distribution (and nearly 50 percent in 
the top 1 percent of growth-oriented ventures). In short, the initial founding conditions create 
considerable disparities across new ventures with respect to their growth orientation.  
But to the extent that startups vary in their initial orientations in ways that influence 
investors’ evaluations and subsequent growth outcomes, these signals of growth might be 
unequally distributed across female and male entrepreneurs. Gendered processes and structural 
constraints imposed on women in the workplace and at home will lead to systematic differences 
between female and male-led ventures at founding. First, founding a high-growth venture 
requires an exposure to novel opportunities and ample resources to exploit those opportunities, 
but structural inequalities in the workplace put women at a considerable disadvantage relative to 
men. Gender practices such as the expectations of an ideal worker (Kelly et al. 2010; Benard and 
Correll, 2010), whereby women are perceived as more committed to family obligations and 
therefore less fit for workplace duties (Acker, 1990; Williams, 2000; Jacobs and Gerson, 2004; 
Correll, Benard, and Paik, 2007), reduce women’s chances to advance to higher-level positions 
or to occupy roles in high-profitability industries (Fernandez and Sosa, 2005; Loscocco et al., 
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1991; Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991). Gender segregation across occupations and jobs can limit 
women’s access to knowledge, information, and resources conducive to identifying high-value 
opportunities on which the founding of a high-growth venture depends.3 This might reduce the 
odds that women will found new ventures in attempts to explore novel technologies or new 
market ideas warranting patent protection or trademarks. 
Second, gendered careers can push women towards certain types of entrepreneurship, 
steering them away from founding ventures with a high-growth potential. Women’s career 
choices are constrained by the disproportionate work-life demands due to childrearing and 
household chores, which fall to a greater extent on women and generate a “time bind” 
(Hochschild and Machung, 2012), or an acute conflict between work and family (e.g., Blair-Loy, 
2003; Bielby and Bielby, 1988). Indeed, even among gender-egalitarian couples with dual 
careers, there are normative expectations that familial obligations and household chores are 
women’s responsibility (Cha and Weeden, 2014; Hochschild and Machung, 2012). The 
obligation of “intensive mothering,” whereby women are required to be constantly available and 
intensively involved in children’s activities, intensifies work-family demands amongst mothers 
(Hochschild and Machung, 2012; Gerson, 2009), pushing them to self-sort into career paths that 
can accommodate family chores and help resolve work-family conflict (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003; 
Barbulescu and Bidwell, 2013). This structural constraint can carry over into entrepreneurship, 
inclining women towards entrepreneurial careers as a way to achieve greater job flexibility and a 
better balance between work and family demands (Georgellis and Wall, 2004; Lombard, 2001). 
Indeed, scholars have argued that women turn to entrepreneurship out of necessity (or as “Plan 
B”) when seeking to have more control over their schedules or to reduce the cost of childcare 
                                                 
3 Studies have shown that women are more likely to found ventures in consumer-oriented and personal services, 
retail, and trade (Anna et al., 2000; Brush et al., 2006). 
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(Boden, 1999; Carr, 1996; Carter et al., 2003; Connelly, 1992; Johansson Sevä and Öun, 2015; 
Thébaud, 2015).  
Because female entrepreneurs will likely overweigh work-family concerns, they will be 
less likely to self-sort into ventures with growth attributes. A number of studies suggest that 
achieving work-life balance is more commonly accomplished through life-style businesses and 
self-employment (Carter et al., 2003; Birley, 1989; Yang, Kacperczyk and Naldi, 2019), rather 
than ventures with high-growth potential. Indeed, informal, home-based productions, unlikely to 
be incorporated or to hold intellectual property rights, are most likely to bestow on women the 
benefits of schedule control, job flexibility, and work-life balance.4 By constrast, founders of 
high-growth startups tend to experience higher levels of work-related stress (Witters and 
Agrawal, 2012), such that many of them and their spouses cope by increasing their use of 
sedative and hypnotic drugs (Dahl et al. 2010). Hence, the work-life conflicts that women 
experience will encourage them to pursue home-based ventures (e.g., self-employment) rather 
than startups with high-growth potential.  
Finally, women might be less likely to found high-growth startups because of the 
considerable gender differences in human and social capital. Negative gender stereotypes 
undermine female representation in technical and scientific fields (Brush et al., 2006; Ding et al., 
2006; Robb and Coleman 2009), and this scarcity can contribute to large disparities between 
female and male entrepreneurs at founding. For example, because women are generally less 
likely to be engaged in patenting or licensing activities (Ding, Murray and Stuart, 2006; Lowe 
                                                 
4 One entrepreneur noted that she pitched a possible investor from her hospital bed the day after giving birth to her 
daughter (Koh, 2018). Another entrepreneur noted the following: “Taking little to no maternity leave is the norm for 
many female founders, particularly these whose firms are simply getting off the ground. Tight deadlines, every day 
crises and the potential for missed opportunities demand it” (Koh, 2018).  
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and Gonzalez, Brambila, 2005), female-founded ventures will be less likely to hold IP rights or 
trademarks. Similar gender disparities can be detected in women’s and men’s social capital, with 
stark differences in structure and composition of their networks (Aldrich, 1989; Cromie and 
Birley, 1992). Social ties are the most important resource for entrepreneurs, since they channel 
capital and endorsement benefits (Stewart, 1990), but women are often excluded from the most 
valuable or resourceful networks (Moore, 1990; Smith, 2000; Ibarra 1992). Such inequalities in 
network structure can carry over into entrepreneurship (Aldrich, Reese, and Dubini, 1989; 
Renzulli, 1998; Ruef et al., 2003), where female founders exhibit strong (Fischer and Oliker, 
1983) and homogenous ties (e.g., Ruef et al., 2003; Renzulli, 1998), which will subsequently 
limit their access to opportunities and resources required for founding a high-growth venture. For 
example, limited access to diverse information, central to identifying high-value market 
opportunities (Aldrich, 1989), will put women at a significant disadvantage when developing a 
new business idea. Similarly, a lack of ties to powerful actors, such as investors, will limit their 
access to valuable support and mentorship that can be critical when developing risky, 
breakthrough ideas. Finally, unequal access to networks deprives women of endorsement 
benefits, which often accrue to individuals when quality is difficult to evaluate directly, 
mitigating any potential discounts in the eyes of resource holders (Tinkler et al., 2015). As a 
result, women face significant obstacles when attempting to mobilize resources and/or develop 
skills necessary to start high-growth businesses.  
Overall, significant differences across female and male entrepreneurs tend to arise at the 
critical stage of a new-venture founding. Gendered processes, in the workplace and at home, 
impose substantial constraints on women, steering them away from the pursuit of high-growth 
ventures. These processes will lead women to make choices at founding that differ 
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fundamentally from those made by men. As gendered processes push women to create less 
growth-oriented companies in favor of low-growth entrepreneurship, we expect that female 
founders will be less likely to make costly investments to make the kinds of choices that 
facilitate growth. Specifically, women will be less likely than men to register their startups in 
Delaware or to found incorporated ventures, in general. Similarly, because female founders will 
be less motivated to appeal to financiers, these female-led ventures will be less likely to adopt 
short, eponymous names that would presumably appeal to financiers. Finally, women will make 
fewer investments in setting up intellectual property assets that are most useful for firms that 
intend to grow. 
Residual Differences 
Whereas initial differences in a venture’s growth orientation can explain a significant 
portion of the gender gap in entrepreneurship, there is reason to expect that these differences will 
continue to persist even when such orientation is accounted for. To the extent that investors play 
an important role in propelling high-growth entrepreneurship (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Nanda 
and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013), gender differences are likely to widen at the funding stage of the 
entrepreneurial process.  
First, negative biases about gender might be particularly prevalent amongst investors, and 
such gendered expectations can put women at a significant disadvantage when accessing 
funding. Theories of discrimination posit, for example, that gender inequalities arise because 
females endure disparate treatment from key resource holders due to discrimination and negative 
stereotypes about gender (Ridgeway and Correll, 2006; Castilla, 2008). These mechanisms are 
particularly likely to apply to the entrepreneurial setting because job-related schemas and 
stereotypes associated with entrepreneurship trigger systematic biases against women. For 
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example, entrepreneurship is often perceived as a male-typed activity (Yang and Aldrich, 2014; 
Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken, 2002; Shane et al., 2012; Lewis, 2006; Wajcman, 2010), 
and cultural beliefs about masculine characteristics can be especially strong for high-growth 
ventures (Gupta, Turban and Bhawe, 2008; Thébaud, 2010). Because women are rare amongst 
founders of high-growth ventures, any such instance can appear even more unusual, raising 
questions about the overall fit or competence of female founders. Put differently, precisely 
because of their atypicality in the entrepreneurship setting, women tend to be perceived as less 
competent or less “natural” entrepreneurs (Kacperczyk and Younkin, 2019). This further 
suggests that resource holders will discount the female entrepreneurs and the investment-
worthiness of their enterprises, putting women at an additional disadvantage.  
Additional tendencies to underinvest in female startups can arise because of investors’ 
preferences for homophily, similarity-attraction, and in-group preference – based on the premise 
that individuals tend to informally associate with others who share salient demographic 
characteristics (e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Given that investors are 
predominantly male (Gompers et al., 2014; Brush et al., 2015), similarity attraction, homophily 
and in-group biases (e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979) will lead to a higher degree of intergroup 
(investor/entrepreneur) interaction or greater liking and attraction (e.g., Tsui and O’Reilly,  
1989), increasing the probability of an entrepreneurial investment in male-led startups. Hence, 
regardless of the actual performance of female-led start-ups, the stereotypes associated with 
entrepreneurship as well as preferences for homophily will generate additional disparities 
between female- and male-led ventures, leading to lower rates of venture capital deals for 
observationally-equivalent start-ups founded or run by women.  
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Finally, to the extent that the residual differences partly reflect cultural bias or negative 
stereotypes of female entrepreneurs, we expect the gender gap to be attenuated under certain 
conditions. Theories of statistical discrimination suggest that stereotypes are activated when 
information is limited or ambiguous (Arrow, 1977; Phelps, 1972). Importantly, reliance on 
ascriptive characteristics or status has been found to decrease as additional information about 
merit or quality become available to evaluators (Podolny, 1993; Simcoe and Waguespack, 2011), 
or when evaluators are themselves more experienced and more capable of discerning quality 
directly without reliance on demographic cues (e.g., Jensen, 2006). For example, Botelho and 
Abraham (2017) find that evaluators are less likely to rely on gender in their evaluations when 
more information about individual performance is available. In the context of entrepreneurship, 
Tinkler et al. (2015) similarly find that venture capitalists are less likely to discount female 
founders when uncertainty decreases due to endorsements provided by entrepreneurs’ network 
ties. Hence, a direct implication of these theories is that the gender gap should diminish when (a) 
growth-orientation signals are stronger and therefore more salient to investors; and (b) when 
investors themselves are more experienced or more sophisticated.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Empirical strategy 
Our empirical strategy relies on conceptually separating the entrepreneurial pipeline into 
events occurring before and after firm founding. Although many past events and individual 
attributes influence the type of a company an entrepreneur will found, most of this heterogeneity 
will be reflected in observable indicators of startup orientation toward growth. Hence, new 
ventures could exhibit stronger or weaker growth orientation and thus be more or less attractive 
to investors. 
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  Using administrative business registration records, we track all new registered5 ventures 
at the time of their legal founding, and document startup attributes at founding, shown to predict 
subsequent growth outcomes: the legal form of organization (e.g. corporation, LLC, or 
partnership), the state of jurisdiction in which they choose to organize the firm (e.g. Delaware or 
local), startup name, industry, founders’ name, and whether a startup has patents and trademarks 
filed close to the time of registration. Because these attributes predict subsequent growth 
outcomes (Guzman and Stern, 2015), they offer a suitable measure of a startup growth 
orientation (or expected productivity) from the investor’s perspective. Thus, in decomposing the 
gender gap in entrepreneurship, it is critical to account for these underlying differences across 
startups. 
We follow the approach of Guzman and Stern (2015) of using predictive analytics with 
ex-post growth outcomes and out-of-sample predictions to examine these numerous founding 
choices, and to compute a summary statistic of “growth orientation.”  Specifically, we estimate a 
proxy measure of the orientation towards the outcome that the venture capitalists institutionally 
seek: the ability to sell equity invested in a startup in a short period of time either through an IPO 
or a high-value acquisition.   
As such, for all startups, irrespective of funding source or outcome, with founding 
characteristics 𝑋𝑖, and an indicator of an equity growth event 𝑔𝑖  six years after founding, we 
define this growth orientation 𝜃𝑖 as the predicted probability of:  
𝜃𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑔𝑖|𝑋𝑖) 
and use its empirical counterpart (𝜃𝑖) as our central measure in interest in understanding the 
                                                 
5 We include all corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies, but exclude sole-proprietorships. Fairle 
et al (2018) present a comprehensive survey of all firms using US Census data, and show there is little transition 
between sole-proprietorships and registered businesses. 
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underlying differences across firms. 
This predictive algorithm allows us to create a single measure of startup growth 
orientation. Guzman and Stern (2015, 2017) find that, though no single observable predicts 
growth completely, together these observables have a high predictive power.6 Using this measure 
to understand differences in potential gains (and therefore new venture’s ex-ante attractiveness) 
to investors (i.e., venture capitalists), we begin to decompose the gap in funding into variation 
accounted for a startup’s growth orientation, versus that which still remains and is partly 
attributable to investors’ bias against female founders.   
Data sources and sample selection 
Business registration records are public records created when individuals register a business. 
Since business registration is a requirement for growth (and for receiving venture capital),  it is 
possible to observe a quasi-population of all startups at risk of receiving such financing at a 
similar foundational moment. 
Our sample consists of all for-profit start-up business registrants in the states of 
California and Massachusetts from 1995 to 2011. These states are particularly suitable for our 
purpose because more than 50 percent of the VC market is located in California, and 10 percent 
of the VC market is located in Massachusetts (by dollars invested in 2014; NVCA, 2015). 
During the period covered by our sample, it was possible to register several types of businesses: 
corporations, limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, and general partnerships.  
Our analysis draws on the complete population of firms satisfying one of the following 
conditions: (a) a for-profit firm whose jurisdiction is in California or in Massachusetts, or (b) a 
                                                 
6 For example, in out of sample tests, they separate up to 70% of all companies that eventually are IPO or are 
acquired. These analyses are conducted on a small sub-sample accounting for only 5% of firms. 
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for-profit firm whose jurisdiction is in Delaware but whose principal office address is in 
California or Massachusetts. We exclude companies whose primary location is external to 
California or Massachusetts. Finally, we merge this database with VentureXpert data, which 
contains detailed information on venture-capital funding. All venture investments in 
VentureXpert are matched by exact name with start-ups registered in California and 
Massachusetts. These selection criteria yield a sample of 1,875,087 start-ups. 
Measures 
Dependent variable 
Venture-Capital Funding. Our primary dependent variable is the reception of VC 
funding. We focus on access to VC funding as the main outcome for several reasons. First, 
venture capital has been a central source of external finance for commercializing innovations in 
the U.S. economy over the past several decades (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Samila and 
Sorenson, 2011). Second, though venture-backed start-ups represent only a very small fraction of 
all new firms (about 1/6 of 1 percent), over 60 percent of IPOs since 1999 have been venture-
backed (Kaplan and Lerner, 2010). The main dependent variable is a dummy equal to “1” if a 
start-up receives VC funding within 2 years after the founding date. We consider a 2-year 
window to control for any potential time heterogeneity, but the results are also robust to different 
time frames. Seventy percent of VC events occur within 2 years.7 For robustness, we consider 
the total amount of capital raised, conditional on VC investment, and find similar results 
(available upon request). 
                                                 
7 This result is consistent with other samples of business registration records containing more states (Catalini, 
Guzman, and Stern, 2016) and samples matching the receipt of VC funds to the U.S. Census Longitudinal Business 
Database (Puri and Zerutskie, 2012). 
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Independent variables 
Female-led start-up. The main independent variable is a dummy equal to “1” if a start-up 
is female-run. The identification of female-led start-ups relies on two conditions: (a) gender 
could be identified for at least one of the main managers of the firm (i.e., the president or the 
CEO of the corporation), and (b) if gender is identified for the management team, all members 
for which we can identify gender are female. We construct a measure of gender based on first 
names provided by the business registration records for individuals in the above-mentioned 
positions. To do so, we use the Social Security Administration list of names registered at least 
five times in a year from 1950 to 2000. To handle ambiguous names (e.g., Taylor), we use only 
names that are five times more common in females than males (or vice versa). Following this 
procedure, we are able to confidently identify gender for 84 percent of firms in our sample. 
Startup Growth Orientation. We use the at-founding characteristics established by 
Guzman and Stern (2015, 2016) as indicators of follow-on, start-up growth. Specifically, 
Guzman and Stern (2015, 2016) establish that certain startup characteristics strongly predict 
whether a startup achieves high growth outcomes, including IPO or a high-value acquisition. 
Following this approach, we use business registration records to construct measures of startup 
growth.  
We first construct two binary measures that relate to how the firm is registered, 
Corporation, whether the firm is a corporation rather than an LLC or partnership, and Delaware 
jurisdiction, whether the firm is registered in Delaware. Corporation is an indicator equal to “1” 
if the firm is registered as a corporation, and “0” if it is registered either as an LLC or a 
partnership. Delaware jurisdiction is equal to “1” if the firm is registered in Delaware but has its 
main office in California (all other foreign firms are dropped before analysis). We then construct 
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two additional measures based directly on the name of the firm. Eponymy is equal to “1” if the 
first, middle, or last name of the top managers is part of the name of the firm itself. Our second 
measure relates to the length of the firm name. Based on our review of naming patterns of 
growth-oriented start-ups versus the full business registration database, a striking feature of 
growth-oriented firms is that the vast majority of their names consist of two words. We define 
Short name to be equal to “1” if the entire firm name has three or fewer words, and “0” 
otherwise. Based on findings of Guzman and Stern (2015), we additionally examine the type of 
traded cluster a firm is associated with, focusing on whether the firm is in a high-tech cluster or a 
cluster associated with resource-intensive industries.8 Finally, an important indicator of a startup 
growth orientation is the presence of patents or trademarks. These measures are constructed 
using a name-matching algorithm that connects the firms in the business registration data to 
external data sources. We include patents filed by the firm within the first year of registration 
and patents assigned to the firm within the first year from another entity (e.g., an inventor or 
another firm). Our second measure, Trademark, is equal to “1” if a firm applies for a trademark 
within the first year of registration. 
Measuring startup growth orientation 
Following the methodology in Guzman and Stern (2015), we estimate the firm-level 
probability of achieving a growth outcome based on observable start-up characteristics. First, we 
estimate the model presented in our methodology section with a growth outcome equal to “1” if a 
firm achieves an IPO or acquisition within 6 years, and include all early-stage observables, as 
described above.   
                                                 
8 For our high-tech cluster group (Traded High Technology), we draw on firm names from industries in 10 U.S. 
Cluster Mapping Project clusters: Aerospace Vehicles, Analytical Instruments, Biopharmaceuticals, Downstream 
Chemical, Information Technology, Medical Devices, Metalworking Technology, Plastics, Production Technology 
and Heavy Machinery, and Upstream Chemical.  
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Although multiple definitions of growth are possible, we use this outcome to correctly 
characterize the venture capital process: growth orientation at founding indicates the potential to 
achieve a successful exit. Accordingly, we construct a dummy variable equal to “1” if the start-
up achieves an IPO or a high-value acquisition within 6 years of registration.9 Both outcomes are 
drawn from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. We observe 1,099 positive growth outcomes for 
the 1995–2005 start-up cohorts (used in all our regressions). The median acquisition price is $77 
million (ranging from a minimum of $11.9 million at the 5th percentile to $1.92 billion at the 
95th percentile). Finally, we use this model to predict the probability of a growth outcome for a 
firm, given its observable characteristics at founding. This probability is a measure of growth 
orientation at the time of firm founding. 
Our initial model excludes gender to allow for estimates of growth orientation to be 
independent of whether a start-up is female or male-run. Thus, for any given firm, our measure 
estimates its likelihood of achieving a growth outcome, given early-stage observables without 
considering the effect of gender on growth. This allows us to further estimate the effect of gender 
while controlling for growth orientation, as indicated by initial startup characteristics. 
Before we turn to analyses of gender, we first discuss our computation of the growth 
orientation metric, as can be seen in Table A1. We begin by estimating a logit regression 
specification with all startup observables, estimated for all firms registered in California and 
Massachusetts between 1995 and 2005. We use the observables shown to have a good fit as well 
as a strong predictive power in out-of-sample tests (Guzman and Stern, 2015, 2016, 2017). We 
find that, amongst new ventures, startups with a “corporation” form are 5.8 times more likely to 
                                                 
9 Thomson Reuters limits acquisitions to known values over $1M dollars.  In unreported analyses, we have 
experimented with higher thresholds of this, finding no significant differences in the analysis.  Similar analyses are 
also in the Supplementary Materials of Guzman and Stern (2016). 
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grow relative to the baseline; startups with a short name are 2.5 times more likely to grow; and 
eponymous startups are 70 percent less likely to grow. New ventures with a trademark are almost 
4 times more likely to grow, startups with a patent are 35 times more likely to grow, and startups 
registered in Delaware are 52 times more likely to grow. Startups that both have a patent and are 
registered in Delaware are 269 times more likely to grow. Finally, firms associated with high-
tech industries are 53 percent more likely to grow, whereas firms associated with local industries 
are 33 percent less likely to grow. Interestingly, this small number of observables accounts for 34 
percent of all statistical variation (pseudo-R-squared). 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for the main covariates. The mean of our independent 
variable, Female, is 22 percent, indicating the share of startups in our sample led by women.  
Figure A1 plots this measure through time, for both California and Massachusetts.  Our main 
dependent variable is a startup access to VC funding (in 2 years and 6 years). We also consider 
subsequent outcomes, such as IPOs and mergers and acquisitions. We provide summary statistics 
for controls, including firm observables, intellectual property observables, industry 
characteristics, and VC-targeted industry controls.  
Table 2 and Figure 1 together provide simple measures of the incidence of female 
founders on all our measures, categorized into three different groups: equity events including 
both VC financing and growth outcomes; growth orientation; and at-founding observables. We 
describe each one in turn.  
In terms of equity events, women-led startups represent a relatively small share (22 
percent) of all startups that achieve any of these events. Female-led startups further account for 
only 10 percent of venture-backed firms, and 7 percent of those that are sold or have an IPO.  
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These initial findings strongly suggest that gender gap in entrepreneurship might reflect, at least 
in part, differences in the kinds of startups and women and men launch. A similar pattern can be 
detected when considering the incidence of female-founded ventures at higher levels of growth 
orientation. Among startups in the top 5 percent by growth orientation, startups led by women 
account for only 13 percent. And among startups in the top 1 percent by growth orientation, 
female-founded startups account for only 10 percent.  
We next turn to firm-level differences at founding to account for such disparities in 
entrepreneurial outcomes across female and male-founded ventures. The results suggest that 
women create startups that differ from those created by men along a number of dimensions, 
including industry, the type of jurisdiction taken (a proxy for intent to both raise venture capital 
and grow), and the use of innovation technology (e.g., patenting). Although women represent 22 
percent of all firms, they account for only 10 percent of startups that have a patent, 12 percent of 
those registered in Delaware, 15 percent of those oriented towards IT, and 14 percent of those 
oriented towards semiconductors. Notably, patenting and registering in Delaware were also the 
characteristics most associated with growth in our predictive model. 
***** Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here ***** 
RESULTS 
Main results 
In Table 3, we assess the baseline hypothesis by considering the probability of obtaining 
VC funding by female-led ventures relative to their male-run counterparts. As shown in column 
1, female-led ventures are 63 percent less likely than male-led ventures to obtain VC funding. In 
column 2, we re-estimate this baseline specification but match female- and male-run ventures on 
our measure of growth orientation. As can be seen, the gender gap decreases to 24 percent, 
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suggesting that as much as 65 percent of the observed differential in access to entrepreneurial 
funding is due to systematic sorting of females and males into ventures of varying growth 
orientation. Finally, in column 3, we re-estimate the baseline specification using the Monte Carlo 
procedure;10 these findings mirror previous estimates, with the estimated gender gap equal to 22 
percent. 
Overall, our results lead to two important conclusions. First, while women are less likely 
to access venture capital than men, most of this gap arises because of the underlying differences 
with respect to startup growth orientation. Therefore, the initial stages of the entrepreneurial 
process play a much larger role in generating disparities between female and male entrepreneurs 
than do subsequent stages. At the same time, female-run ventures continue being less likely to 
access VC funding even when compared to male-run ventures of similar growth orientation. In 
the following section, we perform additional analyses to probe deeper into the mechanisms that 
may potentially explain these residual gender-based differences we observed. 
***** Insert Table 3 about here ***** 
Residual Differences: Statistical Discrimination 
Although our results indicate that most of the gender-based gap in entrepreneurship is driven by 
the initial differences in growth orientation across female- and male-founded ventures, as much 
as 35 percent of this differential persists even when such initial heterogeneity is taken into 
consideration. We further probe the mechanisms likely to explain the residual gender differences 
in the reception of VC funding. Our argument implies that, once differences in growth 
orientation are netted out, the residual variation will partly reflect differences in investors’ bias 
                                                 
10 Given the small number of female-founded firms at the high end, we prefer to match it with multiple different 
male-led firms. To do so, we find 100 random matches (with replacement) for each female firm, then estimate the 
coefficient 100 times and report the coefficient’s empirical distribution. 
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against female entrepreneurs. We conduct additional analyses to examine if our analyses are 
consistent with this explanation.  
The growth-orientation strength 
We begin by examining whether gender bias diminishes for ventures with a stronger 
growth orientation. The results are presented in Table 4 Panel A. Panel A in this table estimates 
gender-based differences in VC funding at different levels of growth orientation. We classify 
entrepreneurial ventures in the following way: (1) 0–95th percentile of growth orientation, (2) 
95–99th percentile, (3) 99th percentile, (4) 99.5th percentile, and (5) 99.9th percentile. This 
partition is particularly suitable to the VC context because the modal investment outcome is a 
failure, and over 50 percent of VC investments are concentrated in the top 1 percent of the 
predicted distribution (see Catalini et al, 2018). For example, Hall and Woodward (2010) report 
that about 50 percent of the VC-backed start-ups in their sample had zero-value exits. Similarly, 
Sahlman (2010) finds that 85 percent of returns can be attributed to just 10 percent of 
investments. Because successful exits are rare for VCs, the latter tend to focus on investments 
with the highest potential. 
As shown in columns 1 through 5, conditional on matching on at-founding observables, 
the gender gap is wider at lower levels of growth-orientation—or for new ventures associated 
with greater uncertainty. In column 1, within the 0–95th percentile, a start-up run by a female is 
33 percent less likely to receive VC funding than a comparable growth orientation start-up run 
by a male. Column 2 shows that the gap decreases for ventures that fall into the 95–99th 
percentile of the distribution: within this category, female-led ventures are 23 percent less likely 
to obtain VC funding than comparable male-led ventures. Column 3 estimates the probability for 
new ventures that fall within the top 1 percent of the distribution. Gender-based differences in 
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access to VC capital continue to decrease: female-led ventures are 16 percent less likely to 
receive VC funding than comparable male-led ventures. Columns 4 and 5 further estimate the 
probability of VC funding for ventures at the top 0.5 percent and 0.1 percent of the estimated 
growth-orientation distribution, respectively. Gender-based differences disappear entirely within 
those subsamples, indicating that female-run start-ups at the top of the distribution are as likely 
as equivalently positioned male-run start-ups to secure important entrepreneurial resources.  
In additional analyses, we tested whether the coefficients in these different models were 
different statistically. Our results show differences in the coefficients are statistically significant 
between the coefficient of the bottom 95% (Column 1) and the coefficient of the 95–99th group 
(Column 2); between the bottom 95 percent and the top 1 percent (Column 1 and Column 3); and 
between the top 1 percent and the top 0.1 percent (Column 3 and Column 5).  The estimated 
differences are not statistically significant between the 95-99th group and the top 1 percent 
(Column 2 and Column 3), or between the top 1% and the top 0.5% (Column 3 and Column 4).  
Overall, these findings are consistent with the theories of statistical discrimination, 
indicating that gender-based differences in access to funding are not uniform across different 
levels of growth orientation; instead, as ventures seem more oriented towards growth (and 
uncertainty decreases), evaluators rely less on gender to assess the potential exit value of a new 
venture. 
Non-sophisticated evaluators 
As a second test, we examine whether the effect of gender varies with the evaluators’ 
sophistication. If statistical discrimination accounts for the residual gap in funding, then we 
should expect the remaining disparities to be greater among non-sophisticated investors.  
To account for investors’ sophistication, we follow Krishnan and Masulis (2012), who 
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calculate a reputation score for the top 1,000 VCs between 1996 and 2002 based on past IPO 
performance. We use their score, expanded to the period 1995–2005. At the firm level, VC 
quality is the maximum of the Series A investors. We consider VCs to be less sophisticated when 
they fall into the bottom quartile of VC-backed firms, based on the reputation score presented in 
Krishnan and Masulis (2012).11 
In Panels B and C of Table 4, we examine the heterogeneous effect of gender on the 
probability of accessing VC funding for sophisticated and non-sophisticated VCs. To do so, we 
re-estimate the baseline specification for the two kinds of VCs, separately. Columns 6 through 8 
report the estimates for the association between female-run ventures and VC funding for 
sophisticated VCs. Columns 9 through 11 re-estimate the same baseline specifications for non-
sophisticated VCs. Whereas the bulk of our paper compares firms across the growth orientation 
distribution, here compare the coefficients of the likelihood of fundraising across more and less 
sophisticated VCs for the same firms. As can be seen in columns 6 and 9, the overall gender gap 
is greater for non-sophisticated VCs (an increase from 14 percent to 22 percent), consistent with 
the notion that less capable evaluators are more likely to rely on gender stereotypes in inferring 
the potential value of a new venture.  A further decomposition of these effects by growth-
orientation levels leads to an important conclusion: differences by investor sophistication stem 
primarily from startups placed outside the top of the growth distribution (columns 7 and 10).  
Once startups have a strong growth orientation (i.e., they are placed within the top of the 
distribution), the effect is indistinguishable from zero for both types of investors. 
 Taken together, these results provide evidence consistent with the proposition that the 
                                                 
11 Notably, during the period 1995–2002 there were a considerable number of non-sophisticated investors in the 
market. Our list is mostly composed of short-lived funds such as the Boston University Community Technology 
Fund and corporate venture capital funds such as the Compaq Computer Corporation. 
29 
residual gap in funding might reflect – at least in part – investors’ bias against female 
entrepreneurs.  
***** Insert Table 4 about here ***** 
Auxiliary analyses: Alternative explanations 
We conduct a number of auxiliary analyses to examine other potential explanations for 
the residual gap in funding between female and male-founded startups. Specifically, we consider 
whether such gap might reflect (a) differences in investment complementarities across female 
and male-founded ventures; (b) differences in investors’ risk taking; and (c) differences in 
individual characteristics of female and male entrepreneurs. 
Gender differences in complementarities of VC funding 
We first assess whether the residual gap in access to VC funding might partly arise 
because female entrepreneurs are less likely to benefit from receiving VC funding than male 
entrepreneurs. For example, fewer complementarities might exist between male-dominated VCs 
and female-run ventures ex-post, reducing investors’ motivation to make bets on female-run 
ventures. Alternatively, female-led ventures that receive funding may be less motivated than 
male-led ventures to pursue successful exit strategies ex-post, which would again discourage 
external investors from making ex-ante investments in female-run ventures. If this were the case, 
female-run ventures would underperform male-run ventures even conditional on access to VC 
funding. 
To investigate this possibility, we examine whether the benefits of getting VC funding 
(i.e., its positive impact on growth outcomes) accrue differently for female- and male-led 
ventures. We consider the two key equity growth outcomes relevant for VC investments—IPOs 
and acquisitions. We then assess the heterogeneous effect of VC funding on those outcomes. As 
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can be seen in Table 5, columns 1 and 3, VC funding has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the probability of filing for an IPO as well as being acquired. The interaction effect 
added in Columns 2 and 4 further shows that the positive impact of VC funding on liquidity 
events is homogenous across male- and female-led ventures, suggesting that female-led ventures 
and male-led ventures are equally likely to exit conditional on access to venture capital. To the 
extent that female-led ventures might be undervalued due to biased investors, these findings 
suggest the possibility that women can still be less motivated or less willing to pursue exit 
strategies ex-post.   
***** Insert Table 5 about here ***** 
VC risk-taking 
Another explanation for the residual gap we observe is that higher-quality VCs might be 
more able and more willing to take risks than lower-quality VCs. If so, then investment in 
female-led ventures may reflect greater propensity to invest in risky ventures. We follow the 
approach of Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) to investigate whether investors are more likely to 
invest in female-led ventures during hot markets.  
In Table 6 Panel A and Panel B, we re-estimate the baseline specification from Table 3 
separately for boom years (Panel A) and bust years (Panel B). The results in columns 1 and 4 are 
comparable and similar to those shown in Table 4, and are not statistically different across boom 
and bust periods. That is, the Female-led start-up coefficient is less than 1 and statistically 
significant (column 1) in both Panel A and Panel B. Columns 2 through 3 and 5 through 6 further 
show that the gender gap decreases as the growth potential of a new venture increases; the gap 
further decreases at the top 1 percent of the growth-orientation distribution. Hence, VCs appear 
to be equally likely to invest in female-led ventures in boom and bust years. In Panel C, we 
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compare the results from Panel A and Panel B directly by estimating an interaction term between 
the female dummy and the boom-years dummy. As shown in column 7, we find that access to 
VC funding is indeed less constrained during boom periods, consistent with prior findings 
(Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013). However, the impact of hot markets on investments in 
entrepreneurial ventures does not vary across male- and female-led ventures. Hence, given these 
findings, it is unlikely that VCs selectively invest in female-led ventures as a form of 
experimentation and risk taking. 
***** Insert Table 6 about here ***** 
Top female founders 
Another possibility is that women who pursue high-growth ventures may differ along observable 
and unobservable characteristics that influence VC evaluation processes and willingness to 
invest. For example, those female founders who are less likely to receive investment may have 
relatively weaker networks than female founders who successfully receive funding. Because 
many studies have related lower performance of female-run ventures to gender differences in 
network structure and composition (Aldrich, 1989; Cromie and Birley, 1992), this explanation is 
credible. Nevertheless, this concern is unlikely to explain our results, for a number of reasons. 
First, if the growth-orientation of female-led ventures is systematically correlated with women’s 
access to networks, then we would expect that sophisticated investors would better evaluate such 
differences. This implies that the gender gap in funding should be greater when investors are 
more sophisticated—given that such investors are better able to evaluate differences across 
entrepreneurs. However, in Table 4 Panel B and C, we find the opposite: as shown in columns 7 
and 10, the gender gap is greater for non-sophisticated than for sophisticated investors. 
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Robustness checks 
Falsification test 
If gender, at least in part, drives differences in access to VC funding, gender differences 
will be at least mitigated when new ventures are composed of mixed-gender management teams. 
Presumably, male representation on the management team will compensate for negative 
stereotypes, if such were associated with female founders. To assess this possibility, we re-
estimate our specification for new ventures with mixed-gender management teams―in this case, 
we consider the gender of individuals registered as president, treasurer, or secretary. These data 
on top management teams are only available for the subsample of business registrants registered 
in Massachusetts. As shown in Table 7 column 1, we are able to replicate the gender gap in 
funding, when a firm registers in Massachusetts. Column 2 additionally shows that the effect 
becomes zero for ventures with mixed-gender management teams. Our inability to replicate the 
results for these ventures reinforces the notion that our results might reflect the effect of gender. 
***** Insert Table 7 about here ***** 
Generalizability 
While our analyses focus on businesses registered in California and Massachusetts, one concern 
may be that these results capture the effect of California only and are not generalizable to other 
locations, either because (a) female-led ventures outside California are much less growth 
oriented, or because (b) investors are less likely to statistically discriminate based on gender in 
other states. Although plausible, the possibility that bias toward female-run ventures is 
systematically higher in California is unlikely—because California is home to Silicon Valley and 
a vibrant entrepreneurial culture. However, to address this possibility formally, we re-estimate 
our baseline specification for the universe of business registrants in Massachusetts (for the same 
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study period) and Texas. Because new ventures in Massachusetts are more commonly founded 
within the biotech sector, the gender gap in obtaining funding may be different. Similarly, 
because Texas is a Southern state, it is worth investigating whether the gender gap can be 
replicated in this setting to alleviate the concern that our results are driven by ventures in 
Northern states alone. 
In Table 8, we replicate similar findings for businesses registered in Texas (columns 1–2) 
and Massachusetts (columns 3–4): the coefficient of the Female-led start-up dummy continues to 
be less than 1, and highly significant statistically across all model specifications. Indeed, the 
gender gap appears to be even wider in Texas, with female-led start-ups having 70 percent lower 
odds of getting funding than male-led start-ups, and in Massachusetts, 33 percent lower. 
***** Insert Table 8 about here ***** 
VC funding time window 
Another potential concern is that gender differences in access to funding may be an artifact of the 
2-year window we chose. Although the majority of ventures tend to obtain VC funding within 
the first 2 years, it is possible that women take longer than men to access venture capital. This 
raises the possibility that female-led ventures might be as likely to obtain VC funding as male-
led ventures when a longer time window is considered. To address this concern, in Table 9 Panel 
A, we re-estimate the baseline specification to examine (a) getting VC funding within a 6-year 
window, and (b) getting funding “ever”—or within the entire period under study. As can be seen 
in Table 9 Panel A, our results are unchanged if we focus on a longer time window. Hence, our 
results are not merely an artifact of different time horizons that female- and male-run start-ups 
might adopt. 
***** Insert Table 9 about here ***** 
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Alternative time periods 
Another concern with our identification strategy might be the period under study. Perhaps the 
gender gap in entrepreneurship has disappeared as female entry into entrepreneurship has 
increased over time. If so, then our results are simply an artifact of the time period chosen. To 
see whether this possibility affects our results, in Table 9  Panel B, we re-estimate our baseline 
specification for different time windows: 1999–2000, 2001–2007, and 2008–2011. As shown in 
columns 7 and 8 of Table 9 doing so is immaterial for our results: we find significant gender 
differences in access to funding in each of the windows considered. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Previous research has shown a stark gender gap in entrepreneurship, with women being 
less successful entrepreneurs than men (e.g., Aldrich, 2005; Reynolds et al., 2004; Ruef et al., 
2003; Yang and Aldrich, 2015). But despite this inequality, our understanding of its origins in 
the entrepreneurial process remains limited. Although entrepreneurship involves a number of 
stages, the majority of research has focused on the gender imbalance that arises at the early-
investment stage (e.g., Canning et al., 2012; Greene et al., 2003; Gatewood et al., 2003; Brush et 
al., 2014; Coleman and Robb, 2009; 2016; Thébaud and Sharkey, 2014). This study, by contrast, 
decomposes the gender gap into separate stages and assesses the relative contribution of each 
stage to the imbalance between female and male founders. Specifically, we propose and find 
support for the notion that gendered processes in the workplace and at home influence the 
opportunity structure that women face, imposing significant constraints on prospective female 
founders. Critically, our findings suggest that these structural obstacles tend to steer women  
away from founding ventures with a high-growth potential. Hence, the well-established pattern 
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of gender segregation seen in wage employment (Fernandez and Sosa, 2005) carries over into 
entrepreneurship, perpetuating stark inequalities amongst women and men. Not only are women 
less likely to found high-growth ventures, but such disparities continue to persist even when 
initial differences at founding are accounted for. Importantly, the residual differences between 
female and male founders can be partly attributed to gender expectations and negative 
stereotypes about gender, which play an important role in widening the initial gap between 
female and male founders.  
We apply a novel empirical approach to separate the initial differences in startup 
characteristics that signal to investors a new venture’s growth orientation and assess their 
magnitude relative to the residual disparity. Building on recent studies using at-founding 
observables to characterize the expected returns of different startups (Guzman and Stern, 2015, 
2016, 2017; Catalini et al, 2018), we theorize and empirically assess differences in initial growth 
orientation across female and male entrepreneurs. 
Our findings confirm the well-established pattern that female-led ventures are 
significantly less likely to obtain funding. As much as 65 percent of the total disparity in funding 
can be attributed to differences in startup growth potential at the time of founding. In this regard, 
our findings suggest that women are significantly less likely than men to found ventures that 
exhibit growth orientation and are appealing to external investors. Specifically, women are less 
likely to found and run startups that have appropriable and differentiated technology (as 
evidenced by patents), to found companies in sectors associated with venture capital such as 
biotechnology, IT, or semiconductors, and to register the company in Delaware—a jurisdiction 
associated with an intent to raise external financing. Women are also more likely to start firms in 
industries associated with a local business activity, rather than traded. 
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The residual gap (i.e., 35 percent of the gap, or 18 percentage points) can be attributed to 
other factors, including, at least in part, investors’ preferences and bias. We provide evidence to 
link this remaining difference with investors’ biases or beliefs about gender. Specifically, we 
find that the gap between female and male entrepreneurs closes when signals of growth 
orientation become stronger (i.e., for female founders at the top of the quality distribution), or 
when investors are more sophisticated. Both findings are consistent with theories of statistical 
discrimination, suggesting that gender can be used as a cue to infer information about a new 
venture when signals of growth potential are weaker or when evaluators are less capable and less 
experienced. 
Collectively, our findings make several contributions. First, we contribute to the growing 
line of research on female entrepreneurship. Our analyses enrich recent and vibrant line of work 
on gender and entrepreneurship (e.g., Kim et al., 2006; Loscocco et al., 1991; Kalleberg and 
Leicht, 1991), as well as work that relates to the processes of discrimination on the part of 
investors (e.g., Jennings and Brush, 2013; Tinkler et al., 2015). We show that the initial 
disparities in growth orientation across female- and male-led ventures are the most significant 
force in generating differences between women and men in the entrepreneurship pipeline. Such 
disparities are likely to reflect gendered processes which generate structural inequalities in 
opportunities for women to pursue different types of ventures. Finally, we offer additional 
evidence to link the residual gap to investors’ preferences. In particular, we find that the residual 
differences in funding diminish when quality signals are stronger and when investors are more 
experienced.  
More generally, our study contributes to work on gender in the strategic context. A vast 
number of strategy scholars have recognized the role of gender in strategy, but these studies have 
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mostly focused on female participation rates in corporate boards (e.g., Helfat et al., 2006; 
Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella, 2007), CEO and executive positions (Cook and Glass, 2014; 
Hill et al., 2014; Heilman et al., 1989), or managerial roles (Blum, Fields, and Goodman, 1994; 
Petersen and Morgan, 1995)—and examined its influence on important firm outcomes, ranging 
from firm performance (e.g., Dezso and Ross, 2012; Hillman et al., 2007; Matsa and Miller, 
2011) to investors’ reactions (e.g., James and Lee, 2007). Yet, the role of gender in driving 
strategic outcomes in the entrepreneurial context has been less well explored. Hence, our study 
contributes to this line of inquiry, shedding light on how gender might shape strategic outcomes, 
such as access to funding, in the context of entrepreneurial firms. 
Our results have important policy implications. Findings presented in the study lead to a 
natural focus on interventions that improve the net-new creation of high-growth entrepreneurship 
rather than the performance of existing ones. Policies aimed at encouraging women to create 
more and higher-potential firms should focus on attenuating deep-rooted gendered processes and 
structural barriers that support their movement away from these ventures. Such policy initiatives 
might, for example, involve improving technological education, mentoring and career 
aspirations, and developing support mechanisms within the family. Similarly, interventions that 
aim at cultural biases prevalent amongst investors will further decrease gender inequality in 
entrepreneurship. Overall, an emphasis on institutional transformation and clear attention to this 
problem from powerful stakeholders at all stages of the venture pipeline can support such a 
change. 
Our findings open up attractive opportunities for future research. First, while our study 
provides evidence that initial differences in the growth orientation of startups across gender drive 
the well-established gender gap in access to venture capital, it does not shed any light on the 
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drivers of such differences. Future research could therefore profitably explore the reasons why 
women tend to found and lead ventures of lower expected economic potential. While these 
reasons are theorized in our study, further empirical inquiry could investigate the differences in 
growth orientation we document. Moreover, our study shows that gender differences are likely to 
be weaker and even non-existent for top-performing startups, opening up attractive opportunities 
for further inquiry. Future studies may, for example, want to assess whether top-performing start-
ups led by females may, under some conditions, gain advantage over start-ups led by males, and 
reach critical entrepreneurial milestones. For example, future studies may want to assess when 
investors are more likely to invest in top-performing female entrepreneurs.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
  N Mean St. Dev. Sum 
Year 1875087 2004.1653 4.4917 3.76E+09 
Gender Measures     
Female-led Start-Up 1875087 0.2212 0.415 414682 
Firm Outcome Measures     
Growth (IPO or M&A in 6 years) 1875087 0.0008 0.0278 1455 
VC Series A in 2 Years 1875087 0.0021 0.0454 3871 
VC Series A in 6 Years 1875087 0.0026 0.0506 4815 
Less Sophisticated VC 2064 0.2485 0.4323 513 
Firm Observables     
Corporation 1875087 6.30E-01 0.4828 1.18E+06 
Short Name 1875087 0.5064 0.5 949510 
Eponymous 1875087 1.67E-01 0.3727 312607 
Delaware 1875087 0.0466 0.2108 87366 
Intellectual Property Observables     
Patent 1875087 0.0045 0.0666 8349 
Trademark 1875087 0.003 0.0548 5643 
Broad Industry Controls     
Local 1875087 0.1556 0.3625 291774 
Traded High Technology 1875087 0.0534 0.2249 100159 
Traded Resource Intensive 1875087 0.1091 0.3118 204610 
Traded 1875087 0.5365 0.4987 1006077 
VC Targeted Industry Controls     
IT Sector 1875087 0.0281 0.1652 52633 
Biotech Sector 1875087 0.0028 0.0529 5255 
Ecommerce Sector 1875087 0.0458 0.2091 85915 
Semiconductor Sector 1875087 0.001 0.0309 1788 
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Table 2. Growth orientation indicators and female-led start-ups  
 
Share of Female-Led Start-ups Across Observables 
All Start-ups 22% 
  
Start-up Outcomes  
IPO or Acquired 7% 
Gets Venture Capital 10% 
  
Incidence Across the Distribution of Growth 
Orientation  
In Top 10% 17% 
In Top 5% 13% 
In Top 1% 10% 
  
Corporate Form and Naming Observables  
Corporation 24% 
Short Name 22% 
Eponymous 22% 
Registered in Delaware 12% 
  
Intellectual Property Observables  
Has Patent  10% 
Has Trademark 21% 
  
Industry Sector Observables  
Local Industries 25% 
Traded Industries 21% 
IT 15% 
Biotechnology 20% 
Ecommerce 17% 
Medical Devices 20% 
Semiconductors 14% 
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Table 3. The probability of female-led ventures getting VC funding in  
2 years 
 Estimate Effect of Female-led start-up 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Logit Regression Bootstrapped Estimate 
Female-led Start-up 0.368*** 0.756*** 0.781*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0439) (.0285) 
    
Corporation  19.04***  
  (1.783)  
    
Short Name  4.010***  
  (0.236)  
    
Eponymous  0.117***  
  (0.0277)  
    
Delaware Only  143.7***  
  (8.416)  
    
Patent Only  47.82***  
  (6.442)  
    
Patent and Delaware  554.3***  
  (38.02)  
    
Trademark  1.373***  
  (0.124)  
Broad Sector Dummies  No Yes  
VC-Targeted Sector 
Dummies  No Yes  
Observations 1875087 1875087  
Pseudo R-squared 0.008 0.483  
We report the results of a logit model with Venture Capital as a binary outcome. Venture Capital 
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm raises venture capital financing and 0 otherwise, as 
reported in Thompson Reuters VentureXpert. Column (1) is the unconditional relationship of 
gender to the probability of equity outcomes.  Column (2) is the same estimate controlling for 
our measures of growth orientation.  Column (3) controls directly for growth orientation using 
the predicted value of Table A1, out of sample. We follow the approach recommended in Imbens 
and Rubin (2015) that includes matching on this value to account for differences in the balance 
across genders through.  Exact matching is possible due to our large sample.  To estimate the 
confidence interval, we bootstrap this estimate 100 times. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 4. Logit regression female-led ventures at different levels of firm and VC sophistication. Matched estimates 
on entrepreneurial growth orientation. 
 
Panel A: P(VC Financing in 2 Years) 
 
(1) 
0–95 percentile 
(2) 
95–99 percentile 
(3) 
top 1% 
(4) 
top 0.5% 
(5) 
top 0.1% 
Regression Coefficient      
Female-led Start-up 0.674*** 0.771*** 0.842** 0.892 1.02 
 (0.066) (0.060) (0.053) (.071) (0.175) 
Summary Stats      
Observations 1,763,556 74,255 18,564 9282 1,857 
Share of All Firms Female-led 24% 13% 11% 9% 8% 
Total Funded Firms 302 736 2,121 1,324 480 
# Female-led VC Funded Firms 48 72 192 115 40 
Share of All Observations 0.0027% 0.10% 1.03% 1.24% 2.15% 
# Male-led Growth Firms 254 664 1929 1209 440 
Share of All Observations 0.0144% 0.89% 10.39% 13.03% 23.69% 
      
t-tests Cols (1) & (2) Cols (1) & (3) Cols (2) & (3) Cols (3) & (4) Cols (3) & (5) 
T-Statistic of Difference in 
Means 1.54 2.87 1.25 0.10 1.38 
T-Statistic p-value (df=100–1) 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.46 0.09 
      
Panel B: P(VC Financing in 2 Years by Sophisticated VC) (1995–2005 Only)(1) 
  (6) 
All Firms 
(7) 
0–99 percentile 
(8) 
top 1% t-test of Difference in Means for Cols (7) & (8)   
Regression Coefficient      
Female-led start-up 0.857* 0.749** 0.947 t-statistic 1.92 
 (0.074) (0.097) (0.109) p-value 0.03 
Ratios reported; Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
We report the results of a logit model with Venture Capital as a binary outcome. Venture Capital is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm raises 
venture capital financing and 0 otherwise, as reported in Thompson Reuters VentureXpert. Ratios reported; Bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
Panel C: P(VC Financing in 2 Years by Non-Sophisticated VC) (1995–2005 Only)(1) 
 (9) 
All Firms 
(10) 
0–99 percentile 
(11) 
top 1% t-test of Difference in Means for Cols (10) & (11)  
Regression Coefficient      
Female Start-up 0.775* 0.440** 1.033 t-statistic 3.30 
 (0.137) (.104) (0.232) p-value 0.00 
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Table 5. Impact of VC on growth outcomes (Only 1995–2005) 
 DV: IPO  DV: Acquisition 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  
IPO 
Firms IPO Firms  
Acq All 
Firms 
Acq All 
Firms 
VC Series A in 2 Years 1.822*** 1.835***  4.274*** 4.375*** 
 (0.213) (0.219)  (0.358) (0.375) 
      
VC Series A in 2 Years * Female-led start-up  0.914   0.731 
  (0.328)   (0.191) 
      
Corporation 21.87*** 21.87***  4.453*** 4.455*** 
 (5.884) (5.885)  (0.404) (0.404) 
      
Short Name 1.798*** 1.798***  2.134*** 2.135*** 
 (0.165) (0.165)  (0.122) (0.122) 
      
Eponymous 0.474*** 0.474***  0.344*** 0.344*** 
 (0.106) (0.106)  (0.0469) (0.0469) 
      
Delaware Only 75.87*** 75.88***  31.28*** 31.29*** 
 (8.098) (8.099)  (1.833) (1.833) 
      
Patent Only 66.38*** 66.40***  31.44*** 31.48*** 
 (13.06) (13.06)  (3.847) (3.850) 
      
Patent and Delaware 517.0*** 517.1***  144.7*** 144.7*** 
 (67.93) (67.94)  (12.31) (12.32) 
      
Trademark 4.784*** 4.782***  5.322*** 5.314*** 
 (0.592) (0.592)  (0.527) (0.527) 
      
Broad Sector Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
VC-Targeted Sector Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1442015 1442015  1442015 1442015 
Pseudo R-squared 0.415 0.415  0.333 0.333 
We report the results of a logit models with a binary outcome of whether a firm receives IPO or acquisition as reported  
in either the SDC New Issues database (for IPOs) or the SDC Worldwide Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances, 
database (for acquisitions).  Incidence ratios reported; Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
Only firms up to 2005 used to allow enough time for growth events to occur in our sample. 
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Table 6. Logit regression impact of female-led start-ups at different levels of firm and VC sophistication during boom and bust cycles 
Panel A: P(VC Financing in 2 Years) during Boom Years (1996–2001)—Split  Panel C: Interaction 
  
(1) 
All Firms 
(2) 
0–99 percentile 
(3) 
top 1% t-test of Difference in Means for Cols (1) & (4) 
 
 
(7) 
All Firms  
Regression Coefficient      Regression Coefficient 
Female-led start-up 0.811** 0.690** 0.946 T-Statistic 0.67  Female-led start-up 0.826+ 
 (0.063) (0.080) (0.114) p-value 0.25   (0.093) 
         
Panel B: P(VC Financing in 2 Years) during Bust Years (2002–2005) Split  Boom 2.37** 
 (4) 
All Firms 
(5) 
0–99 percentile 
(6) 
top 1%  
  (0.357) 
     
Regression Coefficient      Female-led start-up * Boom 0.993 
Female-led start-up  0.857* 0.704** 0.877     (0.150) 
 (0.074) (0.112) (0.144)      
We report the results of a logit model with Venture Capital as a binary outcome. Venture Capital is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm raises venture capital financing and 0 otherwise, as 
reported in Thompson Reuters VentureXpert. Incidence ratios reported. + p< 0.1, * p<.05, ** p < .01. 
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Table 7. The probability of female-led ventures on getting VC funding in 2 years:  
Massachusetts firms. Includes mixed-gender teams. 
  (1) (2) 
Female-led start-up 0.584** 0.523*** 
 (0.108) (0.101) 
   
Mixed-Gender-led start-up  1.031 
  (0.138) 
   
Cluster Dummies Yes Yes 
N 289278 367267 
Pseudo R2 0.449 0.445 
We report the results of a logit model with Venture Capital as a binary outcome. Venture Capital is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the firm raises venture capital financing and 0 otherwise, as reported in Thompson Reuters 
VentureXpert. All models include all controls for venture quality, as in Table 4 Model 2. Model 1 only includes firms 
with all female or all male founders, model 2 includes mixed-gender teams. Mixed-gender teams compose 42% of the 
sample. Female-led start-ups compose 11.23% of the sample. We consider part of the team only those registered as 
president, treasurer, or secretary. 
Table 8. The probability of female-led ventures on getting VC funding in 2 years:  
Texas and Massachusetts 
‘ 
  
(1) 
Texas 
(2) 
Texas 
(3) 
Massachusetts 
(4) 
Massachusetts 
(5) 
California 
(6) 
California 
Female-led start-up 0.0995*** 0.295** 0.301*** 0.667** 0.368*** 0.756*** 
 (0.0412) (0.125) (0.0439) (0.101) (0.0202) (0.0439) 
Founder Observables No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Broad Sector Dummies  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
VC-Targeted Sector Dummies  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 702455 702455 396635 396635 1875087 1875087 
Pseudo R-squared 0.017 0.392 0.010 0.428 0.008 0.483 
We report the results of a logit model with Venture Capital as a binary outcome. Venture Capital is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm raises venture capital 
financing and 0 otherwise, as reported in Thompson Reuters VentureXpert. Columns (5) and (6) simply replicate the  Columns  (1) and (2) from Table 4 for 
ease of comparison. Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
Table 9. Robustness tests 
Panel A: Distribution of effect by time to VC financing 
  
(1) 
Gets VC in 2 Years 
(2) 
Gets VC in 6 Years 
(3) 
Gets VC Ever 
Female-led start-up  0.781*** 0.771*** 0.798*** 
 (.028) (.025) (.027) 
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Panel B: Distribution of effect through time periods 
 (4) 
1995–2000 
(5) 
2001–2007 
(6) 
2008–2011   
Female-led start-up 0.805*** 0.744*** 0.766*** 
 (.054) (.044) (.056) 
We report the results of a logit model with Venture Capital as a binary outcome. Venture Capital is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the firm raises venture capital financing and 0 otherwise, as reported in 
Thompson Reuters VentureXpert. Only firms between 1995 and 2005 used in analysis. Incidence 
ratios. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Matched sample. Quality ranges: Very High, top 1%; 
High, 95% to 99%; Medium, 75% to 95%; Low, less than 75%. Panels C and D use as a dependent 
variable a dummy equal to 1 if a firm patents (trademarks) between years 2 and 6, thus excluding the 
first year, which is included in the quality calculation of the company.  
+ p<.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01. 
 
FIGURE 1. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A1. Growth Orientation Estimation Model 
  (1) 
Corporation 5.751*** 
 (0.681) 
Eponymous 0.301*** 
 (0.067) 
Short Name 2.458*** 
 (0.202) 
Trademark 3.874*** 
 (0.470) 
interactions  
Patent Only 34.70*** 
 [6.858] 
Delaware Only 51.67*** 
 (4.374) 
Patent and Delaware 268.93*** 
 (26.672) 
Industry Dummies  
Local 0.668* 
 (0.120) 
Traded High Technology 1.525*** 
 (0.146) 
Traded Resource Intensive 0.766* 
 (0.093) 
Traded 1.107 
 (0.079) 
Observations 1,064,914 
Pseudo R-squared 0.34 
We report the results of a logit model with Equity Growth as a binary 
outcome. Equity Growth is a binary variable equal to 1 of the firm 
achieves an equity sale—IPO or acquisition—and 0 otherwise, as 
reported in either the SDC New Issues database (for IPOs) or the SDC 
Worldwide Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances, database (for 
acquisitions). The predicted value of the regression above represents 
our ‘growth orientation’. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.. 
Incidence ratios reported. 
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